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Abstract
Following the IPCC's report (2005), which recommended the development and the
use of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technologies in order to achieve the
environmental goals, defined by the Kyoto Protocol, the issue addressed in this paper
concerns the optimal strategy regarding the long-term use of CCS technologies.
The aim of this paper is to study the optimal carbon capture and sequestration
policy. The CCS technologies has motivated a number of empirical studies, via com-
plex integrated assessment models. This literature always considers that the existing
technology allows sequestrating a fraction of the carbon emissions and concludes that
the early introduction of sequestration can lead to a substantial decrease in the cost
of environmental externality. But, the level of complexity of such operational models,
aimed at defining some specific climate policies.
We develop a very simple growth model so as to obtain analytical and tractable
results and therefore exhibit the main driving forces that should determine the opti-
mal CSS policy. We show within this stylized framework that, under some conditions
on the cost of extractions, CSS may be a long-term solution for the carbon emissions
problem. Besides, it is also shown that the social planner will optimally choose to
decrease the rate of capture and sequestration. Besides, we also introduce the decen-
tralization of this simple economy, by considering the individual program of the fossil
resource-holder and the one of the representative consumer. This helps us to compute
analytically the optimal environmental policy, that is the optimal tax scheme, and
also the optimal fossil fuel price profile.
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1 Introduction
The IPCC's report (2005) have recommended the development and the use of carbon
capture and sequestration (CSS) technologies in order to achieve the environmental goals,
defined by the Kyoto Protocol.
Carbon capture and sequestration1 is a theoretical approach to mitigating the contri-
bution of fossil fuel emissions to global warming, based on capturing carbon dioxide (CO2)
from large point sources such as fossil fuel power plants. The carbon dioxide might then
be permanently stored away from the atmosphere. Although CO2 can be injected into
geological formations for various purposes, the long term storage of CO2 is a relatively
untried concept. The first integrated pilot-scale CCS power plant was to begin operating
in September 2008 in the eastern German power plant Schwarze Pumpe run by utility
Vattenfall, in the hope of answering questions about technological feasibility and economic
efficiency. It has been theorized that CCS applied to a modern conventional power plant
could reduce CO2 emissions to the atmosphere by approximately 80-90% compared to a
plant without CCS. The IPCC estimates that the economic potential of CCS could be
between 10% and 55% of the total carbon mitigation effort until year 2100 (IPCC, 2005).
The issue addressed in this paper concerns the optimal strategy regarding the long-term
use of carbon capture and sequestration technologies. Carbon capture and sequestration
is a geoengineering technique for the long-term storage of carbon dioxide or other forms
of carbon. Carbon dioxide is usually captured from the atmosphere through biological,
chemical or physical processes. CO2 may be captured as a pure by-product in processes
related to petroleum refining or from flue gases from power generation. CCS usually refers
to the large-scale, permanent artificial capture and sequestration of industrially-produced
CO2 using subsurface saline aquifers, reservoirs, ocean water, aging oil fields, or other
carbon sinks.
Various forms have been conceived for permanent storage of CO2. These forms include
gaseous storage in various deep geological formations (including saline formations and
exhausted gas fields), liquid storage in the ocean, and solid storage by reaction of CO2
with metal oxides to produce stable carbonates.
Geological sequestration involves injecting carbon dioxide directly into underground
1It is more conventional to use the term carbon capture and storage to describe non-biological processes
of capturing carbon dioxide from combustion at the source.
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geological formations. Oil fields, gas fields, saline formations, and saline-filled basalt for-
mations have been suggested as storage sites. Various physical and geochemical trapping
mechanisms would prevent the CO2 from escaping to the surface. CO2 is sometimes in-
jected into declining oil fields to increase oil recovery. Approximately 30 to 50 million
metric tonnes of CO2 are injected annually in the United States into declining oil fields.
This option is attractive because the geology of hydrocarbon reservoirs are generally well
understood and storage costs may be partly offset by the sale of additional oil that is re-
covered. Disadvantages of old oil fields are their geographic distribution and their limited
capacity, as well as that the subsequent burning of the additional oil so recovered will offset
much or all of the reduction in CO2 emissions. For well-selected, designed and managed
geological storage sites, the IPCC estimates that CO2 could be trapped for millions of
years, and the sites are likely to retain over 99% of the injected CO2 over 1,000 years. In
2009 it was reported that scientists had mapped 6,000 square miles of rock formations in
the U.S. that could be used to store 500 years worth of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions.
Another proposed form of carbon storage is in the oceans. Several concepts have been
proposed:
- dissolution injects CO2 by ship or pipeline into the water column at depths of 1000
m or more, and the CO2 subsequently dissolves;
- lake deposits CO2 directly onto the sea floor at depths greater than 3000 m, where
CO2 is denser than water and is expected to form a lake that would delay dissolution of
CO2 into the environment.
- convert the CO2 to bicarbonates (using limestone).
Despite the lack of certainty about the long-term economic efficiency of the CSS, many
countries have already launched some experiences, which are still operatives. For instance,
four important industrial-scale storage projects are in operation:
1- Sleipner is the oldest project (1996) and is located in the North Sea where Norway's
StatoilHydro strips carbon dioxide from natural gas with amine solvents and disposes of
this carbon dioxide in a deep saline aquifer. The carbon dioxide is a waste product of
the field's natural gas production and the gas contains more (9% CO2) than is allowed
into the natural gas distribution network. Storing it underground avoids this problem and
saves Statoil hundreds of millions of euro in avoided carbon taxes. Since 1996, Sleipner
has stored about one million tonnes CO2 a year. A second project in the Snøhvit gas field
in the Barents Sea stores 700,000 tonnes per year.
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2- TheWeyburn-Midale CO2 Project is currently the world's largest carbon capture and
sequestration project. Started in 2000, Weyburn is located on an oil reservoir discovered
in 1954 in Weyburn, southeastern Saskatchewan, Canada. The CO2 for this project is
captured at the Dakota Gasification Company plant in Beulah, North Dakota which has
produced methane from coal for more than 30 years. At Weyburn, the CO2 will also be used
for enhanced oil recovery with an injection rate of about 1.5 million tonnes per year. The
first phase finished in 2004, and demonstrated that CO2 can be stored underground at the
site safely and indefinitely. The second phase, expected to last until 2009, is investigating
how the technology can be expanded on a larger scale.
3- The site of In Salah, which like Sleipner and Snøhvit is a natural gas reservoir located
in In Salah, Algeria. The CO2 will be separated from the natural gas and re-injected into
the subsurface at a rate of about 1.2 million tonnes per year.
4- In July 2008, the Government of Alberta announced a $2 billion investment in
three to five large-scale carbon capture and sequestration projects. On June 30, 2009,
Government announced three projects it will pursue letters of intent with and work to
have the letters signed in the fall. If discussions with these proponents are not successful,
Government will evaluate its options and may proceed to discussions with other proponents.
The aim of this paper is to study the optimal carbon capture and sequestration policy.
We hence analyze what should be the CSS policy in a deterministic world.2 The CSS
technologies has motivated a number of empirical studies, via complex integrated assess-
ment models (see McFarland et al. 2003; Edmonds et al. 2004; Kurosawa 2004; Gitz et
al. 2005, Edenhofer et al., 2005, Gerlagh, 2006, Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2006). These
papers consider that the existing technology allows sequestrating a fraction of the carbon
emissions. They generally conclude that the early introduction of sequestration can lead
to a substantial decrease in the cost of environmental externality. The level of complexity
of such operational models, aimed at defining some specific climate policy, may be required
so as to take into account the various interactions at hand. In this paper, we consider a
stylized model so as to exhibit the main driving forces that should determine the optimal
CSS policy, in a very simple economy. While a generic abatement option can take several
forms, such as sequestration by forests or pollution reduction at the source, in this paper
2One direct extension, among others, is to take into account the uncertainty linked to CSS efficiency.
The CSS in action are still recent and we do not know exactly the full consequences of such abatement
technologies, in terms of environmental consequences (on oceans for instance), or in terms of efficiency
once we consider the leakage problems.
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we are mainly concerned with the rate of carbon capture and sequestration, although we
also introduce the limited size and an access cost of the reservoir. Thus, and by contrast
to these previous models, we do not consider the optimal level of carbon emissions to cap-
ture and store to achieve a given goal, but we come out with an analytical value of the
instantaneous rate of capture and sequestration, that is the optimal rate of storage.
Following Hotteling (1931), Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Hartwick (1977) who ana-
lyze the optimal use (exploitation/depletion) of environmental resources3, we consider an
optimal growth path of an economy facing a dilemma of consumption vs. pollution. The
framework introduced in this paper, the Ramsey model, is quite similar to the one uses
in the papers dealing with optimal pollution control (van der Ploeg and Withagen; 1991,
Gradus and Smulders; 1996, Ayong Le Kama; 2001, Ayong Le Kama and Schubert; 2004,
2006). Lafforgue et alii. (2008, 2009) and Ragot and Schubert (2009) have already studied
the theoretical consequences of the CCS for some specific cases. Lafforgue et alii. (2008,
2009) consider the energy substitution issues when the economy faces a ceiling on the stock
of pollution in the atmosphere. Ragot and Schubert (2009) analyze the temporality of se-
questration in agricultural soils by considering the asymmetric dynamic process. Finally,
Grimaud et alii. study the implications of the CCS technology availability on the optimal
use of polluting exhaustible resources and on optimal climate policies, within an endoge-
nous growth framework. They conclude that CSS is detrimental to output growth. But
these papers do not consider the CSS technology as a particular tool for the environmental
policy. Moreover, in these papers, the rate of change of the stock of pollution or of the
stock of the environmental resource, that is the natural rate of absorption/regeneration,
is given. The framework introduced here is different since we determine endogenously the
optimal rate of carbon sequestration, as if the rate of change of the stock of pollution
becomes endogenous. This framework originates from Ayong Le Kama and Fodha (2009)
who study the optimal rate of nuclear waste storage, but in a partial equilibrium case.
The model introduced in this paper is very simple. We consider an economy with only one
good which is fossil energy fuel. This good comes from the extraction of a non-renewable
and given resource stock. Its consumption generates environmental damages due to the
release of carbon flows into the atmosphere. For simplification, we assume that the flows
of carbon are proportional to the level of consumption. Consumption and pollution enter
in a separable way into the utility function. Besides, we assume that the social planner
3See for example Heal (1993) for a survey on these topics.
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can capture and store a part of the carbon flow in some appropriately deep sinks. Hence,
the social planner goal is to choose the optimal CSS rate policy. We show, under some
conditions on the cost of extractions, that CSS may be a long-term solution for the carbon
emissions problem. We also introduce a decentralized economy by considering the individ-
ual program of the fossil resource-holder and the one of the representative consumer. This
will help us to compute analytically the optimal environmental policy, that is the optimal
tax scheme, and also the optimal fossil fuel price profile.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 studies
the optimal dynamics of fossil resource extraction and sequestration. It also provides an
illustration of optimal trajectories by using some specified functional forms. Section 4
derives the decentralized equilibrium outcome and characterizes the carbon tax trajectory
that implements the optimum. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Let us consider an economy in which, at each date t, the unique consumption good is a
flow of fossil energy fuel xt. This good exhibits two main properties. First, it comes from
the extraction of a non-renewable and initially given resource stock X0. The current fossil
resource stock Xt thus evolves over time as follows:
X˙t = −xt (1)
We denote by c(Xt) the marginal cost of extraction (also equal to the average cost), which
is assumed to be decreasing and convex in Xt. The marginal extraction cost thus grows
as the resource is depleted in order to reflect the fact that the more accessible deposits are
exploited first.
Second, consumption of this fossil resource provides utility but it also generates some
environmental damages due to the release of carbon flows into the atmosphere associated to
the combustion of the fossil fuel. For the sake of simplicity, we assume additive separability
between utility and damage (i.e marginal utility is not impacted by pollution). We denote
by u(xt) the instantaneous flow of utility provided by the consumption of xt units of fossil
energy and by v(Pt) the instantaneous flow of damage associated with the atmospheric
carbon stock Pt. We assume that u(.) has the standard properties (increasing, concave,
Inada) and that function v(.) is increasing and convex. Net utility flows are discounted at
rate ρ, where ρ is the pure rate of time preferences.
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The unitary carbon content of fossil fuel is β so that, without any abatement at the
pollution source, the instantaneous carbon emissions would be βxt. We assume that a CCS
device is available from the initial date and we note γt the rate of sequestration, i.e. the
proportion of carbon emissions that is captured and stored into geological reservoirs. The
instantaneous flow of carbon sequestration is then equal to st = γtβxt and the dynamics
of storage is given by:
S˙t = st = γtβxt (2)
where St is the cumulated quantity of carbon stored into carbon sinks, S0 been given. We
also assume that the maximum amount of CO2 that can be captured and stored is limited
by the physical capacity S¯:
St ≤ S¯ ∀t (3)
To motivate this assumption, we can argue that carbon emissions are mainly stockpiled
into empty geological deposits, such as oil sinks or gas fields, and those potential reservoirs
are available themselves in finite quantities. CCS is costly and we assume that the seques-
tration cost D(γt, xt) depends both on the level of emissions and the rate of sequestration.4
For simplicity, we impose D(γt, xt) = βxtd(γt), where function d(.) is increasing and con-
vex in γt. Then, sequestration costs are linear in carbon emissions, but not in the rate of
sequestration in order to reflect decreasing returns in the associated CCS technology.
Finally the atmospheric carbon accumulation process is captured by the following dy-
namic constraint:
P˙t = (1− γt)βxt − αPt, P0 given (4)
where (1− γt)βxt are the carbon emissions net of abatement and α is the natural rate of
decay of the atmosphere.
3 The optimal extraction and CCS paths
3.1 Optimal program and first-order conditions
Let us denote by Wt the objective function, i.e. the social welfare function, of the optimal
program:
Wt = W (Xt, St, Pt) = max{xs,γs}s≥t
∫ ∞
t
[u(xs)− v(Ps)− c(Xs)xs − βxsd(γs)] e−ρsds (5)
4For the sake of computational conveniences, we do not assume here that the sequestration cost depends
on the cumulated past storage St.
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Then, we explicitly assume that utility flows are expressed in monetary terms. The social
planner chooses a fossil fuel consumption profile (xt)t≥0 and a sequestration rate trajectory
(γt)t≥0 that maximize the social welfare function Wt at time t = 0, subject to constraints
(1)-(4) and to:
xt ≥ 0 (6)
0 ≤ γt ≤ 1 (7)
Here we make several points before solving this optimal program. As usually assumed,
we will not consider the non-negativity constraints on the state variables. From the Inada
condition, the non-negativity constraint on xt will never be binding, except asymptotically,
so we do not consider them further here. Finally, we examine the case where the economy
is not constrained by (7) and we will check this condition ex-post.
The corresponding Hamiltonian in current value writes:
H = u(xt)− v(Pt)− c(Xt)xt − βxtd(γt)
−λtxt + µtγtβxt + ηt [(1− γt)βxt − αPt] + ξt
(
S¯ − St
)
where λt, µt, ηt are the co-state variables associated with state equations (1), (2) and (4).
Those variables read respectively as the scarcity rent of the fossil resource (∂Wt/∂Xt),
the implicit (social) marginal value of carbon capture and storage (∂Wt/∂St), the implicit
(social) marginal cost of releasing CO2 into the atmosphere (∂Wt/∂Pt). Intuitively, along
any optimal path, we may obtain non-negative values for λt and non-positive values for
µt and ηt. Moreover, ξt denotes the social cost of sequestration coming from a tightening
in the limited capacity constraint of reservoir, formally the Lagrange multiplier associated
with constraint (3).
The first-order conditions are:
∂H
∂xt
= 0 ⇒ u′(xt) = c(Xt) + λt + β[d(γt)− γtµt]− (1− γt)βηt (8)
∂H
∂γt
= 0 ⇒ d′(γt)− µt = −ηt (9)
∂H
∂Xt
= ρλt − λ˙t ⇒ λ˙t = ρλt + xtc′(Xt) (10)
∂H
∂St
= ρµt − µ˙t ⇒ µ˙t = ρµt + ξt (11)
∂H
∂Pt
= ρηt − η˙t ⇒ η˙t = (ρ+ α)ηt + v′(Pt) (12)
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The complementary slackness condition and the transversality conditions are:
ξt(S¯ − St) = 0, ξt ≥ 0 (13)
lim
t→∞λtXte
−ρt = 0 (14)
lim
t→∞µtSte
−ρt = 0 (15)
lim
t→∞ ηtPte
−ρt = 0 (16)
Equation (8) equates the marginal utility of consuming one unit of fossil energy with
its full marginal cost. This last term can be decomposed in: i) the marginal extraction
cost c(Xt), ii) the resource scarcity rent λt, iii) the full cost of sequestration β[d(γt)−γtµt]
by unit of fossil fuel use, and iv) the marginal social cost of augmenting the atmospheric
carbon stock by the flow of residual emissions, i.e. (1− γt)βηt. Equation (9) says that the
full marginal cost of carbon burying (left-hand-side) must be equal to its social marginal
gain in terms of atmospheric carbon concentration reduction (right-hand side). Equation
(10) is no other than the Hotelling rule in the case of stock-dependent extraction costs.
Equation (11) implies that the implicit marginal value of CCS must grow at the pure
rate of time preferences ρ, augmented by ξt which reflects the limited capacity of carbon
sinks. Note that, from (13), this last term is nil as long as the reservoir is not fulfilled and
non-negative otherwise, which means that µt obeys to the Hotelling rule only during the
phase along which CCS is active. Finally, equation (12) says that the social marginal cost
of atmospheric CO2 accumulation must grows at a rate equal to the sum of the pure rate
of time preferences augmented by the natural rate of decay5, and the marginal damage.
Finally, remark that replacing (µ − η) by d′(γ) from (9), the first-order condition (8)
can be rewritten as:
u′(xt) = c(Xt) + λt + β[d(γt)− γtd′(γt)− ηt] (17)
3.2 Optimal dynamics
First, we solve the non-homogeneous differential equations (11) and (12) by using the asso-
ciated transversality conditions (15) and (16), respectively, in order to identify initial values
5This first term can be seen as a "modified" discount rate in order to take into account that emitting
an additional unit of carbon today yields a marginal return ρ tomorrow, but it also increases the future
marginal regeneration of the atmosphere by α.
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µ0 and η0. For any t, solutions are given by (stars in exponent refer here to optimality):
µ∗t = −
∫ ∞
t
ξse
−ρ(s−t)ds (18)
η∗t = −
∫ ∞
t
v′(Ps)e−(ρ+α)(s−t)ds (19)
Since ξt ≥ 0 from (13) and v′(.) > 0 by assumption, we can then check that µ∗t and η∗t are
non-positive for any t. The social marginal cost of sequestration (by unit of CO2 emitted)
is equal to the discounted sum over time of the instantaneous costs of the reservoir capacity
constraint, from t up to ∞. The social marginal cost of atmospheric carbon concentration
is equal to the discounted sum (at rate ρ+α) over time of instantaneous marginal damages,
from t up to ∞.
Next, to solve the optimal program in the deterministic case without leakage, we need
to find the optimal expression of ξt. Let us assume that the carbon reservoir is fulfilled at
a finite date t¯ << ∞. We will discuss about an eventual asymptotic fulfilling up of the
reservoir later. Obviously, t¯ is determined from St¯ = S¯ and thus depends on the size S¯ of
the reservoir. For any date t > t¯, we have S˙t = 0, which implies γtβxt = 0. But due to the
Inada conditions that we have imposed, the fossil resource stock can be exhausted only
asymptotically, which finally implies γt = 0 for any t ≥ t¯. Since, in that case, (9) writes
d′(0) = µt − ηt, we must have µ˙t − η˙t = 0, ∀t > t¯. From (11) and (12), we thus obtain
ξt = αηt + v′(Pt)− ρd′(0), ∀t ≥ t¯, which, by using (19), implies:
ξ∗t =
{
0 , t < t¯
v′(Pt)− ρd′(0)− α
∫∞
t v
′(Ps)e−(ρ+α)(s−t)ds , t ≥ t¯
(20)
Recall that ξ∗t reads as the optimal social value of the limited capacity constraint of carbon
reservoirs or, in other words, as the marginal increase of social welfare coming from a
marginal increase of S¯. It is equal to zero as long as the reservoir is not filled, and it takes
some positive value thereafter. Moreover, from the non-negativity condition (13), we must
impose the following constraint:
1
ρ
[
v′(Pt)− α
∫ ∞
t
v′(Ps)e−(ρ+α)(s−t)ds
]
> d′(0), ∀t > t¯ (21)
which states that it is optimal to fulfill up the carbon sink in finite time if and only if the
net marginal damage divided by the social discount rate at some future date after fulfilling
is larger than the initial marginal sequestration cost by unit of CO2 emission. Here, the
net marginal damage at date t is defined by the instantaneous marginal damage v′(Pt) at
10
this date, diminished by the discounted sum (at rate ρ+α) from t up to infinity of all the
marginal damages that will be avoided owing to natural cleaning-up of the atmosphere.
Replacing ξ∗t by its expression (20) into (18), expanding computations and after sim-
plifications, we obtain:
µ∗t =
{ − ∫∞t¯ v′(Ps)e−ρ(s−t)e−α(s−t¯)ds+ d′(0)e−ρ(t¯−t) , t < t¯
− ∫∞t v′(Ps)e−(ρ+α)(s−t)ds+ d′(0) , t ≥ t¯ (22)
We determine now the optimal dynamics of the two control variables xt and γt. We
start with γt by differentiating (9) with respect to time and by replacing µ˙t and η˙t by their
expressions coming from (11) and (12), respectively:
d′′(γt)γ˙t = ρµt + ξt − (ρ+ α)ηt − v′(Pt) (23)
Using (9) again, it comes:
d′′(γt)γ˙t = ρd′(γt) + ξt − αηt − v′(Pt) (24)
Proceeding in the same way with xt (i.e. differentiating (17) with respect to time and
replacing the time derivatives of the co-state variables by their corresponding expressions),
we obtain after simplifications:
u′′(xt)x˙t = ρ(λt − βηt)− βγtd′′(γt)γ˙t − β
[
αηt + v′(Pt)
]
(25)
which, once have been used (24), becomes:
u′′(xt)x˙t = ρ[λt − βηt − βγtd′(γt)]− β
{
γtξt + (1− γt)[αηt + v′(Pt)]
}
(26)
Using (17) again and replacing ξt by its expression coming from (24), we finally get:
u′′(xt)x˙t = ρ[u′(xt)− c(Xt)− βd(γt) + βγtd′(γt)]− β
[
γtd
′′(γt)γ˙t + αηt + v′(Pt)
]
(27)
where ηt is defined by (19). Unfortunately, without specifying functional forms, we are not
able to go further in the computation of the optimal trajectories. In the next subsection,
we provide an analytical example of optimal sequestration and consumption trajectories.
11
3.3 Analytical example
We first postulate that the marginal damage is constant over time: v′(Pt) = v, ∀t ≥ 0.
With this analytical simplification, expressions (19), (20) and (22) become:
η∗t =
−v
ρ+ α
(28)
ξ∗t =
 0 , t < t¯ρ [ vρ+α − d′(0)] , t ≥ t¯ (29)
µ∗t =

−
[
v
ρ+α − d′(0)
]
e−ρ(t¯−t) , t < t¯
−
[
v
ρ+α − d′(0)
]
, t ≥ t¯
(30)
Assuming a constant marginal damage leads to constant implicit costs of reservoir limited
capacity constraint ξ∗ and atmospheric CO2 concentrations η∗. This last result implies
that the net present value of future damages, discounted at rate (ρ + α) is constant over
time. Moreover, the implicit cost of CCS µ∗t becomes constant at the date at which the
carbon reservoir is filled. Beforehand, it is increasing over time and continuity condition
at t = t¯ is satisfied. Remark that the existence condition (21) writes now:
v
ρ+ α
> d′(0) (31)
which implies that the net present value of future damages must be larger than the initial
marginal sequestration cost in order to provide incentives enough for CCS.
We have next recourse to the same quadratic CCS cost function than in Gerlagh et al.
(2006), and which is defined as follows:
d(γt) = γt
(
1 +
κ
2
γt
)
(32)
where κ, κ > 0 is the index of convexity of this function, i.e. d′′(.) = κ. Remark that
the initial marginal sequestration cost by unit of emission is now unitary, i.e. d′(0) = 1.
Consequently, the existence condition (21) is reduced to v > ρ+ α, i.e. the instantaneous
marginal damage must be larger than the "modified" social discount rate. Introducing
these specifications into (24) yields to:
γ˙t = ργt +
1
κ
[
ξ∗ − ρ
(
v
ρ+ α
− 1
)]
(33)
Given (29) and the fact that γt = 0 for any t ≥ t¯ by definition of t¯, the solution of the
non-homogeneous differential equation (33) is:
γ∗t =

1
κ
(
v
ρ+α − 1
) [
1− e−ρ(t¯−t)
]
, t < t¯
0 , t ≥ t¯
(34)
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where the initial value of γ∗t is given by:
γ∗0 =
1
κ
(
v
ρ+ α
− 1
)(
1− e−ρt¯
)
(35)
Let us finally turn to the computation of the optimal energy consumption path. Using
the analytical specifications introduced above, (27) reduces to:
u′′(xt)x˙t = ρ
[
u′(xt)− c(Xt)− βγt
(
1 +
κ
2
γt
)
− β(1− γt) v
ρ+ α
]
− βγtξ∗ (36)
which, by using (29), can be expanded as follows:
x˙t =

ρ
u′′(xt)
[
u′(xt)− c(Xt) + βγ∗t |t<t¯
(
v
ρ+α − 1− κ2γ∗t |t<t¯
)
− βvρ+α
]
, t < t¯
ρ
u′′(xt)
[
u′(xt)− c(Xt)− βvρ+α
]
, t ≥ t¯
(37)
where γ∗t |t<t¯ is determined from (34). Once γt have been replaced replaced by its optimal
expression (34) into (36), we get an autonomous system of non-homogeneous differential
equations in (xt, Xt)t≥0, together with (1), that can be solved. From the determination
of optimal controls γ∗t and x∗t , we will next be able to characterize S∗t and P ∗t . Finally,
from the continuity condition on stock St, we will characterize the optimal date t¯ of carbon
reservoir filling up, depending upon the limited capacity S¯ and the other parameters of
the model. However, at this step, we need functional forms for u(.) and c(.) to solve the
problem at the end. We pose u(xt) = a lnxt and c(Xt) = c, with a, c > 0.
Eliminating the stock effect on fossil resource extraction significantly simplifies the
problem since it make differential equation (10) homogeneous. When the marginal extrac-
tion cost is constant, we recover the standard Hotelling rule λ˙t = ρλt, whose solution is
λ∗t = λ0eρt, where λ0 is such that
∫∞
0 x
∗
t = X0. First-order (17) condition can be thus
rewritten as:
a
x∗t
= c+ λ0eρt − β
(
κγ∗2t
2
+ η∗t
)
= c+
βv
ρ+ α
+ λ0eρt − βκγ
∗2
t
2
(38)
Given (34), this expression is equivalent to:
x∗t =

a
[
c+ βvρ+α + λ0e
ρt − β2κ
(
v
ρ+α − 1
)2 (
1− e−ρ(t¯−t)
)2]−1
, t < t¯
a
[
c+ βvρ+α + λ0e
ρt
]−1
, t ≥ t¯
(39)
and then, the initial energy consumption level is:
x∗0 = a
[
c+
βv
ρ+ α
+ λ0 − β2κ
(
v
ρ+ α
− 1
)2 (
1− e−ρt¯
)2]−1
(40)
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All these findings are summarized into the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the specific analytical example introduced above, the optimal sequestra-
tion rate and the optimal energy consumption {γ∗t , x∗t } are characterized by:
γ∗t =

1
κ
(
v
ρ+α − 1
) [
1− e−ρ(t¯−t)
]
, t < t¯
0 , t ≥ t¯
(41)
x∗t = a
[
c+
βv
ρ+ α
+ λ∗0e
ρt − βκγ
∗2
t
2
]−1
, t ≥ 0 (42)
where the couple of variables {t¯, λ∗0} is determined by the following system of equations:∫ ∞
0
x∗t = X0 (43)
β
∫ t¯
0
γ∗t x
∗
tdt = S¯ (44)
Those solutions are illustrated in Figure (1). Since γ˙ = − ρκ
(
v
ρ+α − 1
)
e−ρ(t¯−t) < 0,
the optimal sequestration rate starts from its initial value γ∗0 as defined by (35), and
declines over time up to 0 which is reached at date t¯, as showed in the northeast quadrant
of Figure (1). The northwest quadrant draws the optimal fossil energy as a function
of the optimal sequestration rate. Since from (41), (42) can be rewritten as x∗(γ∗t ) =
a
[
c+ βvρ+α + λ
∗
0e
ρt¯ − λ∗0κ
(
ρ+α
v−ρ−α
)
γ∗t − βκ2 γ∗2t
]−1
for any t < t¯, it is easy to see that this
energy consumption function is increasing and convex in γ∗. The southwest quadrant
is a purely technical device to show how the energy consumption is derived from the
sequestration rate at the same time, which is finally illustrated in the southeast quadrant
of Figure (1). We thus obtain an optimal consumption trajectory that is declining over time
and continuous at t = t¯, but that exhibits a kink at t = t¯ (i.e. its slope is discontinuous
at this point of time). Note that, for any t ≥ t¯, the rest of the optimal trajectory is
characterized by (42) when γ∗t = 0. As expected, the fossil resource exhaustion occurs
then asymptotically.
Let us now check the existence conditions of the optimal solutions mentioned in Propo-
sition 1. First, a direct implication of ξ∗t ≥ 0 is that γ∗t ≥ 0 for any t. Second, a necessary
and sufficient condition for having γ∗t smaller than 1 is γ∗0 ≤ 1. Such a condition leads to:
t¯ ≤ −1
ρ
ln
[
1− κ(ρ+ α)
v − ρ− α
]
(45)
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Figure 1: Optimal sequestration rate and fossil energy consumption
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Condition (45) also provides some insights about the value of t¯. If v > (ρ+α)(κ+ 1), (45)
guarantees that carbon reservoir is fulfilled in finite time. Else, t¯ can be finite as well as
infinite. Finally, we have x∗t ≥ 0 for any t ≥ t¯ and x∗¯t > 0, which insures that x∗t > 0 for
any t < t¯ since x∗t is monotonically decreasing over time. The following table summarizes
these findings.
Condition for: v ≤ ρ+ α ρ+ α < v ≤ (κ+ 1)(ρ+ α) (κ+ 1)(ρ+ α) < v
γ∗t > 0 No Yes Yes
γ∗t ≤ 1 Yes Yes Yes
t¯ finite Not necessary Not necessary Yes
Table 1: Conditions of existence
4 Decentralization of the economy and implementation of the
optimum
In this section, we decentralize the economy which have been studied above by considering
the individual programs of the fossil resource-holder and of the consumer. We assume
perfect competitive markets and we denote by pt and rt the fossil fuel price and the real
interest rate on financial markets, respectively. In order to correct the environmental
externality, we introduce a carbon tax profile {τt}∞t=0. Note that, due to the CCS device,
the tax applies on the sole part of carbon emissions which are effectively released into the
atmosphere after sequestration. In that sense, carbon taxation is disconnected from the
fossil resource use.
The resource-holder chooses the extraction path {xt}∞t=0 that maximizes the discounted
sum over time of its current profits
∫∞
0 [pt − c(Xt)]xt exp
(
− ∫ t0 rsds) dt subject to the
constraint (1). First-order conditions imply:
p˙t = rt[pt − c(Xt)] (46)
which is no other than the standard Hotelling rule with extraction costs, and which states
that the resource rent must grow at the real interest rate.
The program of the resource-user consists in choosing the consumption and sequestra-
tion rate trajectories {xt}∞t=0 and {γt}∞t=0 that maximize
∫∞
0 [u(xt)−βxtd(γt)−ptxt−τt(1−
γt)βxt] exp (−ρt)dt, subject to constraints (2), (3) and (7). As in the previous section, we
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examine the case where the decision-maker is not constrained by (7), which leads to the
following first-order conditions:
u′(xt) = βd(γt) + pt + τtβ(1− γt)− βγtµet (47)
d′(γt) = τt + µet (48)
µ˙et = ρµ
e
t + ξ
e
t (49)
where, by analogy with the optimal program, µet and ξ
e
t are, respectively, the multipliers as-
sociated with constraints (2) and (3), but now expressed at the equilibrium. Differentiating
(47) with respect to time and using (48), it comes:
u′′(xt)x˙t = p˙t + βτ˙t − βγtd′′(γt)γ˙t (50)
Along any equilibrium trajectory, pt is governed by the dynamic condition (46) so that,
after simplifications and using (47) again, (50) can be rewritten as:
u′′(xt)x˙t = rt
{
u′(xt)− c(Xt)− β[d(γt) + γtd′(γt) + τt]
}
+ βτ˙t − βγtd′′(γt)γ˙t (51)
There exists a particular equilibrium {xet (τt), γet (τt)} associated with any carbon tax tra-
jectory. This set of equilibria is characterized by the condition (51) above. By analogy
between this condition and the corresponding condition (27), we can determine the carbon
tax trajectory that implements the optimum. Noting that the optimal interest rate must
be equal to the social time preference index, i.e. rot = ρ, ∀t ≥ 0, the optimal tax scheme
τ ot is such that:
τ˙ ot = ρτ
o
t − αη∗t − v′(P ∗t ) (52)
where η∗t is defined by (19) and where P ∗t denotes the trajectory of atmospheric carbon
accumulation that is followed at the optimum. Results about the implementation of the
optimum are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The optimal environmental policy and the associated interest rate and fos-
sil fuel price are given by:
τ ot = τ
o
0 e
ρt −
∫ t
0
[αη∗s + v
′(P ∗s )]e
−ρ(s−t)ds (53)
rot = ρ (54)
pot = p
o
0e
ρt − ρ
∫ t
0
c(X∗s )e
−ρ(s−t)ds (55)
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where the initial values of τ ot and p
o
t are determined by:
τ o0 =
1
β
[
u′(x∗0)− βd(γ∗0) + βγ∗0d′(γ∗0)− po0
]
(56)
po0 = c(X0) + λ
∗
0, with λ
∗
0 s.t.
∫ ∞
0
x∗tdt = X0 (57)
Finally, we illustrate those findings by using the same analytical forms than the ones
that have been introduced in the previous section. Under specifications, we obtain pot =
c + λ∗0 exp (ρt) from (55) and (57). From (53), the specified optimal tax trajectory writes
τ ot = τ
o
0 exp(ρt)+(1−exp(ρt))v/(ρ+α). However, from (56), we find an initial level of tax
equal to v/(ρ + α). This implies that, in the specified version of the model, the optimal
carbon tax is constant over time and equal to τ ot = v/(ρ+α), ∀t ≥ 0. The optimal carbon
price at any time t should be equal to the sum from t up to ∞ of the future marginal
damage involved by the emission at time t of one unit of carbon and discounted at rate
(ρ+α) in order to take into account that carbon is naturally absorbed into the atmosphere
at rate α by unit of time. Obviously, in the special case where instantaneous marginal
damages are considered as constant, the optimal carbon tax should also be constant over
time.
5 Conclusion
Following the IPCC's report (2005), which recommended the development and the use of
carbon capture and sequestration (CSS) technologies in order to achieve the environmental
goals, defined by the Kyoto Protocol, the issue we have addressed in this paper concerns
the optimal strategy regarding the long-term use of carbon capture and sequestration
technologies.
The aim of this paper was to study the optimal carbon capture and sequestration pol-
icy. We then tried to analyze what should be the CSS optimal policy in a deterministic
world. As we pointed out in the introduction, the CCS technologies has motivated a num-
ber of empirical studies, via complex integrated assessment models. This literature always
considers that the existing technology allows sequestrating a fraction of the carbon emis-
sions and concludes that the early introduction of sequestration can lead to a substantial
decrease in the cost of environmental externality. But, the level of complexity of such
operational models, aimed at defining some specific climate policies. In this paper, we
have introduced a very simple model so as to obtain analytical and tractable results and
therefore exhibit the main driving forces that should determine the optimal CSS policy.
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We have shown within this model that, under some conditions on the cost of extrac-
tions, CSS may be a long-term solution for the carbon emissions problem. Besides, it is
also shown that the social planner will optimally choose to decrease the rate of capture
and sequestration. We have also introduced a decentralized economy by considering the
individual program of the fossil resource-holder and the one of the representative con-
sumer. This helped us to compute analytically the optimal environmental policy, that is
the optimal tax scheme, and also the optimal fossil fuel price profile.
However, all this results are obtained in a deterministic world. One direct and natural
extension of the model, among others, might be to take into account the uncertainty linked
to CSS efficiency. The CSS technologies in action are still recent and we do not know
exactly the full consequences of such abatement technologies, in terms of environmental
consequences (on oceans for instance), or in terms of efficiency once we consider the leakage
problems.
Introducing a risk of leakage in this model will certainly brings more insights on the
understanding and the characterizing of the optimal carbon capture and sequestration
policy. One easy way to do that is, like in Ayong Le Kama (2001), to assume for example
that there is a possibility that at a random future date, with a given marginal density
(with a known distribution, Poisson or Exponential), an accident may occur, with a given
probability, which implies a leakage, that is a destocking of a part of the accumulated
quantity of carbon stored.
Extending the framework of the paper by introducing this double uncertainty (on the
level of the leakage and on the date at which this occurs), which is more close to the real
world, will significantly change the behavior of the central planner. For example, under
uncertainty, the marginal utility of consuming one unit of fossil energy will now be equal
to its expected full marginal cost. Namely, the levels of resource scarcity rent, of the CCS
cost and of the marginal social cost of augmenting the atmospheric carbon stock by the
flow of residual emissions will all depend on whether or not the accident has occurred. It
will be the same for the equality between the full marginal cost of the CCS technology and
its net social marginal gain; it will hold only if the accident has never occurred. Besides,
the Hotelling rule will be completely modified, the evolution of the scarcity rent will in this
case, as it is the case in the real world, on the marginal valuation of the non-renewable
resource stock available at each time t. This will also be the case for the growth rate of
the social marginal cost of atmospheric CO2 which will depend not only on the probability
that the accident occurs, but also on the expected marginal bequest of pollution, that is
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the marginal negative valuation of the atmospheric pollution stock time t.
All these examples point out the fact that it is necessary to take into account the
management of the risk of leakage when we want to study the optimal CCS policies. This
paper has tried to first exhibit the main driving forces that should determine these optimal
policies, but in a deterministic world. The next step is by the way... natural.
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